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ABSTRACT  Over the past quarter century, labor’s share of income in the 
United States has trended downward, reaching its lowest level in the postwar 
period after the Great Recession. A detailed examination of the magnitude, 
determinants, and implications of this decline delivers five conclusions. First, 
about a third of the decline in the published labor share appears to be an artifact 
of statistical procedures used to impute the labor income of the self-employed 
that underlies the headline measure. Second, movements in labor’s share are 
not solely a feature of recent U.S. history: The relative stability of the aggregate 
labor share prior to the 1980s in fact veiled substantial, though offsetting, move-
ments in labor shares within industries. By contrast, the recent decline has been 
dominated by the trade and manufacturing sectors. Third, U.S. data provide 
limited support for neoclassical explanations based on the substitution of capital 
for (unskilled) labor to exploit technical change embodied in new capital goods. 
Fourth, prima facie evidence for institutional explanations based on the decline 
in unionization is inconclusive. Finally, our analysis identifies offshoring of 
the labor-intensive component of the U.S. supply chain as a leading potential 
explanation of the decline in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years.
ever since Kaldor (1957, 1961) documented his growth facts, the con-stancy of the share of income that flows to labor has been taken to be 
one of the quintessential stylized facts of macroeconomics.1 After several 
1. It is important to realize, however, that the proposed stability of the labor share is as 
stylized now as it was controversial when Kaldor classified it as a prototypical growth fact. 
Kaldor’s claim was met by an extensive literature on measuring the movements in labor’s 
share during the first half of the 20th century.
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decades of modest variation, prominent measures of labor’s share in the 
United States have declined significantly. The headline measure pub-
lished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) historically fluctuated 
around a mean of close to 64 percent from the immediate postwar period 
to the mid-1980s. Thereafter, aside from a brief surge surrounding the 
tech bubble at the turn of the 21st century, this measure has displayed a 
downward trend, averaging around 58 percent in recent years, 6 percent-
age points below the level that prevailed during the first four decades of 
the postwar period.
In this paper, we examine the magnitude, determinants, and implica-
tions of the movements in the U.S. labor share over the past 25 years. 
Our paper follows in the footsteps of an extensive literature that has 
investigated fluctuations and trends in labor’s share dating back to the 
first half of the 20th century.2 We address three main themes. First, we 
identify the sources of income and the underlying industry-level trends 
that account for the decline of the U.S. labor share. Second, we consider 
possible explanations for the decline. Finally, we reflect on whether the 
recent decline warrants a major rethink of the way the labor share is used 
by macroeconomists.
Section I documents the measurement of the headline labor share 
published by the BLS and the role played in its decline by each of its 
constituent income sources. We show that most of the recent downward 
trend in the labor share has its origins in reductions in the compensation 
of payroll employees as a fraction of gross value added, what we shall 
refer to as the “payroll share.” However, the decline in the share of the 
remaining source of labor income, that of the self-employed, is shown 
to be overstated in the headline measure. This measure is constructed 
under the assumption that average wages among the self-employed are 
the same as those of payroll employees. We provide evidence suggesting 
that this assumption induced the headline measure to imply a negative 
capital share among the self-employed during the 1980s, thereby over-
estimating labor’s share and casting doubt on subsequent trends in that 
series. Two alternative measures proposed in the early work of Kravis 
(1959) have less extreme implications for the returns to capital among 
the self-employed. Comparison of these two alternative measures with 
the headline series informs our conclusion that around a third of the 
decline in the headline measure is a symptom of the method used to 
impute self-employment income.
2. For a comprehensive list of this early literature, see Gallaway (1964), footnote 1.
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Once the issues surrounding measurement of the labor income of the 
self-employed are considered, almost all of the remaining decline in the 
labor share is accounted for by the decline in the payroll share. For this 
reason, and because the payroll share is comparatively straightforward to 
measure and can easily be disaggregated, we focus in the remainder of the 
paper on understanding the movements of the payroll share.
In section II we address the sectoral origins of the decline in the pay-
roll share using disaggregated industry-level data. We find that, viewed 
from a sectoral perspective, movements in labor’s share are not a feature 
solely of recent U.S. history: The relative stability of the aggregate labor 
share prior to the 1980s in fact veiled substantial, though offsetting, move-
ments in labor shares within industries. The shift from manufacturing to 
services over this period served to depress the aggregate payroll share, as 
labor shares in manufacturing exceeded those in services. This effect was 
undone, however, by substantial rises in payroll shares within industries, 
especially healthcare, prior to the 1980s.
By contrast, these coincidental offsetting effects have not been mirrored 
since the late 1980s, the period in which the recent decline in the aggregate 
payroll share has emerged. The recent decline has instead been dominated 
by within-industry declines in payroll shares, particularly in manufacturing 
and trade, as opposed to compositional shifts.
A small group of industries also accounts for the higher-frequency rise 
and fall in the labor share in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Consistent 
with the timing of the tech bubble that arose then and with the widespread 
use of stock options in employee compensation in the tech sector, we find 
that around half of the rise and fall in the aggregate payroll share between 
1998 and 2003 is accounted for by the changes in payroll shares of a 
small set of industries that cover investment banking and the tech sectors, 
despite their small share in total value added.
Thus, the results in section II reveal that aggregate movements in the 
payroll share owe much to underlying movements in particular indus-
tries. Understanding the evolution of the aggregate payroll share therefore 
requires an understanding of changes in payroll shares across sectors. This 
insight is confirmed by our analysis in section III.
In that section we show that explanations for the decline in the labor 
share that rely solely on an aggregate perspective provide, at best, an 
incomplete account of the movements in the labor share. A leading candi-
date among these explanations is the neoclassical notion that declines in 
the relative price of investment goods, such as computer equipment, have 
induced firms to replace workers with machines. This hypothesis, which 
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dates back to Hicks (1932), highlights the role of capital-labor substitut-
ability and capital deepening in the determination of income shares, and 
it has recently been revived by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013). Two 
corollaries of this account are not supported by U.S. data, however. First, 
when the decline in the labor share accelerated in the 2000s it was not 
accompanied by an increase in the rate of capital deepening. Second, con-
trary to the predictions of simple versions of the theory, growth in real 
wages and output per hour actually slowed down during the 2000s rather 
than accelerating. We find similar tensions in other, more elaborate neo-
classical explanations, such as the role played by an increasing skill-share 
of the labor force in the presence of capital-skill complementarity.
In section IV, we go beyond an aggregate production function repre-
sentation and investigate the sources of the within-industry changes in 
payroll shares by exploiting cross-industry data. Our analysis identifies 
a strong correlation between increases in import exposure and declines 
in labor share at the industry level. Strikingly, we find that this statistical 
relationship could account for 3.3 percentage points of the 3.9 percentage- 
point decline in the U.S. payroll share over the past quarter century. We also 
revisit the capital-labor substitutability hypothesis by examining whether 
the industries that saw the smallest increases in equipment prices were the 
ones that experienced the largest declines in payroll shares. Reiterating 
our aggregate analysis, we find little support in the cross-industry data for 
this explanation. Prima facie evidence for another potential explanation—
the decline in the bargaining power of workers due to deunionization—is 
inconclusive: there is a statistically imprecise relation between cross-industry 
changes in unionization rates and sectoral declines in payroll shares that 
includes both potentially large (and small) effects within conventional con-
fidence intervals.3
In section V we conclude by considering how these facts and explana-
tions affect the way macroeconomists should think about the labor share. 
3. A small but growing literature has focused on understanding trends in the labor share 
across countries. In an early example, Blanchard (1997) focuses on the declines in labor 
shares in continental Europe during the period 1980 to 1995. Blanchard identifies two poten-
tial explanations: the first is a shift in the distribution of rents from workers to firms; the 
second is the adoption of technologies that use less labor and more capital. His empiri-
cal results provide weak support in favor of the second explanation. More recent studies, 
such as Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Guscina (2006), Azmat, Manning, and van Reenen 
(2011), Harrison (2005), and Jaumotte and Tytell (2007), analyze the role of several factors 
in accounting for cross-country movements in labor shares. While there is no consensus on 
the drivers of these changes, deregulation, technological progress, globalization, and openness 
to trade emerge as potential leading explanations.
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We first show that, in spite of the recent movements in the labor share, the 
assumption of (approximate) constancy of the labor share is still useful 
in many applications. For example, estimates of total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth are almost unaffected by the recent variation in factor shares 
observed in the United States. Second, we argue that theories and applica-
tions that use the labor share as an indicator of the state of the business 
cycle are affected by the decline. Such theories implicitly assume the 
labor share fluctuates around a constant mean; an assumption rendered 
invalid by the decline. Moreover, many components of the compensa-
tion captured in the labor share, like self-employment income and stock 
options, are not part of firms’ marginal costs. This makes the labor share 
a highly imperfect measure of cyclical marginal cost pressures that drive 
inflation. Finally, we illustrate why one has to be careful to interpret the 
decline in the share as showing increased inequality between capital(ists) 
and workers. We show that the labor share in the United States has in 
fact been buoyed up increasingly by the rising income shares of very rich 
workers, such as CEOs. Thus, the decline in the labor share conceals, 
rather than exposes, most of the large increases in inequality that have 
emerged in recent decades.
Of course, our conclusions are based on the recent movements of the 
labor share relative to its history. If the recent steep decline continues, this 
would lead to a more drastic reconsideration of the use of the labor share in 
empirical macroeconomics than we advocate. With that in mind, we con-
clude the paper by briefly discussing what forces might drive movements 
in labor’s share in the foreseeable future.
I. Measurement and the Impact of Self-Employment Income
A first priority of any analysis of the evolution of the labor share is to docu-
ment its empirical behavior. We begin by reviewing the path of the most 
commonly cited headline measure of the labor share, namely the labor 
share for the U.S. nonfarm business sector, which is published as part of 
the BLS Labor Productivity and Costs release.4
4. The results in this paper are based on data through July 28, 2013, and do not include 
the 2013 benchmark revisions of the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA), 
which affect the level and path of the labor share in two ways. First, they add part of 
intangible expenditures to value added, due to the capitalization of intangible invest-
ments. This increase in value added shows up as an increase in net operating surplus and, 
by construction, a reduction in the labor share. This increase is partly offset by an increase 
in measured compensation due to a change in the way pension benefits are accounted for. 
In the end, these revisions had little effect on the trends in the labor share.
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In this section, we contrast the behavior of this published series with 
several alternative measures of the labor share. Our findings indicate that 
the headline measure has overstated the decline in the labor share because 
of the way self-employment income is imputed in the construction of the 
headline number.
I.A. Evolution of the Headline Labor Share Measure
The evolution of the headline labor share measure during the postwar 
period is depicted by the black line in figure 1, and some related sum-
mary statistics are provided in table 1. Four observations are apparent 
from these. First, the labor share exhibited no obvious trend during the 
first four decades of the postwar era. From 1948 through 1987 it hovered 
around a mean of 63.6 percent. Second, one can discern a trend decline in 
the labor share since the late 1980s. Third, the share spiked in the late 1990s 
Percent
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Self-employment share
Payroll share
Published
Replicated
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and authors’ calculations.
Figure 1. labor share, Payroll share, and replicated labor share in U.s. nonfarm  
business sector, 1948-2013
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Table 1. sources and Magnitude of the Decline in the labor share
Measure Mean
Mean 
1948–87
Mean 
2010–12 Change
Composition of nonfarm business sector income
1. Compensation (payroll share) 56.5 57.1 53.3 -3.9
2. Proprietors’ income w/o CCA and IVA 8.8 9.0 8.4 -0.6
3. Taxesa 9.8 9.9 9.9 0.0
4. Rental, interest, and depreciation 13.9 12.4 16.4 3.9
5. Profits 11.0 11.6 12.1 0.5
Alternative measures of the labor share
6. Labor basis – published 63.6 64.6 58.3 -6.4
7. Asset basis – MFP 62.6 62.9 59.3 -3.6
8. Economy-wide basis 62.0 62.7 58.1 -4.7
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
a. Sample covers 1948Q1 to 2013Q1.
and early 2000s. Finally, the trend decline that started in the late 1980s has 
accelerated over the last decade, with the labor share receding from 
its high in 2001 to a historic postwar low in the wake of the Great 
Recession. It averaged 58.3 percent over the period 2010 to 2012. The 
difference between the 1948–1987 and 2010–2012 period averages 
implies that the share of income that flows to workers has declined by 
6.4 percentage points.
The methodology used to construct this headline measure is but one of 
a number of alternative approaches to measuring labor’s share, however. 
All these measures have one thing in common: They capture the ratio of a 
measure of aggregate labor compensation to an analogous measure of all 
factor income generated, which equals gross value added. Thus, the labor 
share, which we denote by l, is equal to the ratio of labor compensation to 
gross value added:
WL
PY
(1) ,λ ≡
where W is the average compensation per hour worked, L is the total 
number of hours worked, P is the price, and Y is the quantity produced. 
While this formulation is conceptually simple, neither the numerator 
nor the denominator is straightforward to measure. The measurement of 
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labor compensation, WL, turns out to be particularly important for the 
decline in l.5
Labor compensation is the sum of payments to two groups of workers. 
The first group comprises workers who are on employers’ payrolls. Their 
compensation consists of their wages and salaries, as well as supplements 
to them in the form of employer contributions to pension and insurance 
funds and to social insurance. We denote the compensation of these payroll 
employees by WPLP. Measurement of WPLP is relatively straightforward, 
being based primarily on employer payroll records from the Quarterly Cen-
sus of Employment and Wages, which covers 98 percent of payroll jobs in 
the United States.6 For this reason, it is often referred to as the “unambigu-
ous” part of labor compensation (Gomme and Rupert 2004). In what fol-
lows, we will refer to the share of value added paid to these employees as 
the payroll share, and denote it by lP = WPLP/PY.7 The dark-shaded area in 
figure 1 reflects this payroll share.
The second group of workers consists of those who work for themselves 
rather than for an employer. The income of these self-employed indi-
viduals8 reflects both returns to their work effort and returns to the busi-
ness property they invested in. As Krueger (1999) points out, isolating the 
component of self-employment income that accrues to labor (as opposed 
to profits or other factors of production) is fundamentally ambiguous. Con-
sequently, there is no direct measure of (hourly) labor compensation for 
the self-employed. Thus, analysts of labor’s share must adopt a position on 
how to measure this second component of labor compensation.9
5. As far as the denominator is concerned, the measurement of gross value added involves 
the choice of what are considered intermediate inputs and what are capital goods. A change 
in the classification of some of these expenditures, as in the 2013 benchmark revisions of 
the NIPA, results in a change in the level of gross value added. It also involves the choice of 
which sectors to include and which not, and whether the denominator is constructed using 
data from the expenditure or income sides of the national accounts (Grant 1963). For the 
postwar period the latter turns out to be immaterial, because the statistical discrepancy was 
relatively small during that period.
6. Estimates for the most recent quarter are based on the more timely survey data from 
the Current Employment Statistics program of the BLS.
7. It is also referred to as the “employee compensation share” (Gollin 2002).
8. Also known as proprietors’ income, or noncorporate business income.
9. In addition, from a practical perspective, there are known measurement problems 
associated with reported self-employment income. Chief among these is that available mea-
sures are thought to be subject to substantial underreporting. Based on Internal Revenue 
Service estimates of “tax gaps” for the 2001 tax year, Slemrod (2007, table 1) reports that 
as much as 57 percent of nonfarm proprietors’ income is not reported on tax returns when it 
should have been. In addition, as Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2010) argue, there is substantial 
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We denote the imputed component of labor compensation paid to the 
self-employed by WSLS. The light-shaded area in figure 1 is the fraction of 
value added that is attributed to self-employment income in the headline 
measure of the labor share. Self-employment income in this headline mea-
sure is imputed under the assumption that average hourly compensation for 
the self-employed is the same as for those on payroll. That is, WS = WP for 
all quarters in the postwar period. Under this assumption, the labor share 
can be constructed by rescaling the payroll share by one plus the ratio of 
the hours of the self-employed and payroll-employed,
L
L
S
P
P( )λ ≡ + λ(2) 1 .
The underlying source data on hours worked necessary to replicate the 
BLS methodology are available dating back to 1964. The dashed line in 
figure 1 demonstrates that, using these data, we can closely replicate the 
published labor share under this assumption. The share of hours of the self-
employed in total hours, LS/L, has declined steadily from about 14 percent 
in 1948 to 8.5 percent in 2012. This is why figure 1 indicates a declining 
wedge between the labor and payroll shares during the postwar period. In 
spite of the relatively small share of self-employment hours, the treatment 
of self-employment income plays an important role in the recent behavior 
of the evolution of the labor share plotted in figure 1.
I.B. The Role of the Treatment of Self-Employment Income
The assumption of equal hourly compensation for payroll employees 
and the self-employed that is used to construct the headline labor share 
measure is only one way to impute the labor income of the self-employed. 
In this subsection we examine the behavior of a set of alternative measures 
of the labor share based on different assumptions on the measurement of 
WSLS. This approach was pioneered by Kravis (1959, table 1).
underreporting of self-employment income in household surveys. Changes in under reporting 
of self-employment income can also affect the evolution of the labor share. However, 
figure 4 in Hurst, Li, and Pugsley (2010) suggests that the timing of changes in underreport-
ing does not coincide with the evolution of the labor share. According to their calculations, 
underreporting was high during the early 1980s, fell between the late 1980s and mid-1990s, 
and increased once again during the late 1990s and early 2000s, but still remains below its 
level in the early 1980s when the labor share was higher.
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The basic problem that each of these alternative measures addresses is 
that the different sources of factor income reported in the national accounts 
do not map directly onto parts attributable to capital and labor. Figure 2 and 
table 1 summarize the distribution of all factor income generated by the non-
farm business sector across five broad categories. The first is payroll compensa- 
tion and unambiguously reflects payments to labor. The second category 
is proprietors’ income, which as discussed above reflects a mixture of the 
labor and capital income of the self-employed. The remaining three catego-
ries are better classified as either direct or implicit payments to capital.10
Percent
Quarterly observations
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations.
Note: Share of gross value added of NFB sector.
40
50
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Labor share, published
Profits
Taxes
Rental, interest, and depreciation
Proprietors’ income w/o CCA and IVA
Compensation
Figure 2. composition of nonfarm business sector income, 1948–2013
10. The taxes that are part of this component are “taxes on production and imports” 
(TOPI). They include federal excise taxes and customs duties, state and local sales taxes, 
property taxes (including residential real estate taxes), motor vehicle licenses, severance 
taxes, and special assessments. Some studies, like Gomme and Rupert (2004), classify 
taxes as ambiguous income that reflects a mixture of payments to capital and labor as well. 
The replication files provided with this paper also include a measure of the labor share that 
divides these taxes into payments to capital and labor. This does not matter much for the 
implied decline in the share.
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Measures of the labor share thus have to take a stance on the part of pro-
prietors’ income that reflects payments to labor. Kravis (1959) introduced 
four different assumptions that can be used to cut the Gordian knot of esti-
mating the labor income of the self-employed, and we provide an update of 
his results. The first assumption corresponds to that underlying the headline 
measure—that is, equal wages for self-employed and payroll-employed. 
This is what Kravis calls the “labor basis” measure of self-employment 
income. For reference it is plotted as the “labor share” in figure 2.
Kravis’ second measure attributes all of proprietors’ income (exclusive 
of capital consumption allowances [CCA] and inventory valuation adjust-
ments [IVA]) to the labor input of the self-employed. We call this the 
“all-to-labor basis” measure. The labor share that one obtains using this 
measure is represented by the two lightest shaded areas in figure 2. While 
this clearly is an overstatement of the labor compensation of the self-
employed—it assumes after all that none of proprietors’ income flows to 
capital—it is nonetheless instructive.
A comparison of this “all-to-labor basis” share with the published 
labor share is particularly revealing. Figure 2 shows that the share of 
proprietors’ income included in the labor share implicitly increased from 
around 80 percent in 1948 to 100 percent in 1981. From 1981 through 
1991, the level of imputed self-employment income in the headline labor 
share measure even exceeded the level of proprietors’ income, a point to 
which we shall return shortly. Crucially for recent trends in the published 
share, between 1987 and 2012 the share of proprietors’ income attributed 
to labor implicit in the headline measure has decreased from 121 percent 
to a postwar low of 55 percent. Consequently, as can be seen by combin-
ing the first two rows of table 1, at 4.5 percentage points the decline in the 
“all-to-labor basis” is substantially smaller than the 6.4-percentage-point 
decline in the headline measure. Moreover, rows 1 through 5 of the table 
reveal that only a small part of the decline in the “all-to-labor basis” share 
is due to an increase in the share of corporate profits. Instead, the bulk of 
the decline can be traced back to an increase in the share of capital services 
as reflected in rental and interest income, as well as capital depreciation.
The fact that the headline labor share measure exceeded the “all-to-labor 
basis” measure from 1981 to 1991 has the pathological implication that 
the capital share, and hence the marginal product of capital, were in fact 
significantly negative during the 1980s in the proprietors’ sector. By the 
same token, the large movements since the 1980s in the capital share of 
proprietors’ income implicit in the published series imply very large swings 
in return to capital among proprietors. These observations indicate that the 
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headline number significantly overstated the actual labor share during the 
1980s, which calls into question subsequent trends in that series. To get a 
sense of this, it is useful to compare the headline number with the remain-
ing two measures proposed by Kravis (1959).
The first of these is based on the assumption that the returns to capital, 
as captured by its user cost, are the same for the capital used by the payroll-
employed and that used by the self-employed. Kravis refers to this as the “asset 
basis” measure of self-employment income. Conceptually, this approach is 
very similar to the way self-employment labor income is inferred in the BLS 
Multifactor Productivity (MFP) data, and so we present that estimate here.11 
This measure has, for example, been used by Fernald (2012) to construct 
his real-time growth accounting data set. 
The second of the remaining Kravis measures instead assumes that the 
labor share in entrepreneurial income is the same as that for the overall 
economy, what Kravis names the “economy-wide basis” measure. Gomme 
and Rupert (2004) favor this measure, for example.
Figure 3 compares these two alternative measures with the published 
headline measure, and table 1 includes some related summary statistics. 
Three observations stand out. First, from 1948 through 1987 the published 
measure is, on average, more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the 
two alternative measures. Second, aside from a period during the 1980s, 
the two alternative measures lie very close to each other. Third, since the 
mid-1990s all three measures have converged. Rows 6 through 8 of table 1 
summarize the impact of these three observations on the measured declines 
of the labor share. The decline in each of the alternative labor share mea-
sures is at least 1.7 percentage points smaller than the 6.4 percent decline 
in the headline measure.
The upshot of these comparisons is that around one third of the decline 
in the headline measure of labor’s share appears to be a by-product of 
the methods employed by the BLS to impute the labor income of the 
self-employed. Alternative measures that have less extreme implications 
regarding the return to capital among proprietors are more consistent with 
one another and indicate a more modest decline.
I.C. Reevaluating the Headline Measure
Since the published share is constructed under the assumption of identi-
cal payroll and self-employment wages, and taking the alternative series in 
11. Since Kravis’s (1959) analysis predates Jorgenson’s (1963) derivation of the user-
cost equation, Kravis’s “asset basis” measure is different from the one in the MFP release, 
which is user-cost based.
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figure 3 at face value, the recent convergence of these measures suggests 
a sharp rise in the average hourly compensation of proprietors relative to 
the payroll-employed since the late 1980s. Such large trend shifts in the 
relative wages of the self-employed therefore potentially play a crucial role 
in the decline of the headline labor share measure. A key question, then, is 
what might explain these trend shifts.
The most compelling evidence emerges from comparisons of the evolu-
tion of the income distributions within, respectively, the payroll-employed 
and the self-employed. Following Piketty and Saez (2003), we disaggre-
gate the structure of the labor share associated with wages and salaries, 
and proprietors’ income, by fractile of the population.12 This analysis can 
be implemented through 2010 thanks to updated data from the World Top 
Percent
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008 2013
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and authors’ calculations.
58
60
62
64
66
Published - Labor basis
Economy-wide basis
MFP - Asset basis
Figure 3. alternative Measures of labor share based on three estimates of  
self-employment labor income, 1948–2013
12. Strictly speaking, Piketty and Saez emphasize that the data correspond to fractiles of 
the distribution of “tax units,” defined as a married couple or single adult together with their 
dependents, as opposed to individuals.
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Incomes Database, created by Facundo Alvaredo and others, which in turn 
are drawn from Internal Revenue Service tax returns statistics.13
The results of this exercise are illustrated in figure 4. The aggregate 
series depicted by the uppermost bold black line corresponds to the sum 
of the compensation and proprietors’ income areas in figure 2, the “all-to-
labor basis” measure of the labor share. The lower dashed black line 
corresponds to payroll compensation as a fraction of value added, in the 
previous notation. The shaded regions that these two aggregates comprise 
depict the portion of the labor share from each source that is accounted for 
by each fractile of employees and proprietors, respectively.
13. The database, authored by Facundo Alvaredo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas 
Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez and published online in 2013 as The World Top Incomes Data-
base, may be found at http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu (last accessed 
07/29/2013).
Percent
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis; IRS; authors’ calculations; and 
Alvaredo, The World Top Incomes Database (http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu). 
Note: Labor share here includes all proprietors’ income without IVA and CCA (“All-to-labor basis”). 
Top 0.1–0.01% Top 0.5–0.1%
Top 1–0.5% Top 5–1%
Top 10–5% Lower 90%
All-to-labor basis Payroll share
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Figure 4. nonfarm business labor share split Up by income Fractile, 1948–2013
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Figure 4 demonstrates that the share of income accounted for by both 
payroll wages and salaries and by proprietors’ income has been buoyed up 
since the 1980s by substantial rises in the shares accounted for by the very 
top fractiles of households in the United States. Indeed, the majority of the 
stability of the aggregate series has been sustained by rises in the income 
shares of just the top 1 percent of taxpayers.
This rise in inequality is even more striking for proprietors’ income 
than it is for payroll income. In 1948 the bottom 90 percent of employees 
earned 75 percent of payroll compensation. By 2010 this had declined to 
54 percent. For entrepreneurial income, however, this fraction declined 
from 42 percent in 1948 to 14 percent in 2010. Even more starkly, over 
the same period the share of proprietors’ income accounted for by the bot-
tom 99 percent fell from 74 percent to 45 percent. This suggests that the 
sharp rise in the average hourly compensation of proprietors relative to the 
payroll-employed since the late 1980s is related to substantial increases in 
income inequality among proprietors that dominate even the considerable 
rise in inequality witnessed among the payroll-employed. Moreover, this 
has been driven by extreme rises in proprietors’ income at the very top of 
the income distribution—the top 1 percent in particular.14
I.D. Summary
In this section, we have provided evidence to suggest that part of the 
trend decline observed in the published headline measure of the labor 
share in the United States is spurious. We have highlighted the impor-
tant role played by the methods used to impute the labor income of the 
self-employed, in particular the assumption of equal hourly compensation 
between employees and the self-employed. The two most commonly used 
alternative measures of the labor share—the “economy-wide basis” and 
“asset basis” measures—exhibit more modest trend declines, and provide 
similar depictions of movements in labor’s share. Moreover, rises in com-
pensation at the very top of the distribution of proprietors have been even 
14. Of course, this evidence is merely suggestive. For one, we do not have measures 
for hours worked for the IRS tax units. However, the trends in inequality are of a mag-
nitude too large to be offset by similar differential trends in hours worked. Moreover, 
this increase in inequality among entrepreneurial income also could reflect an increase in 
inequality in income flows from capital held by entrepreneurs rather than in labor. Inequal-
ity, especially for proprietors’ income, might be understated in figure 4 because, as Johns 
and Slemrod (2010) point out, underreporting of income is more prevalent among high 
income earners.
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more extreme than among employees, suggesting that the average hourly 
compensation of the self-employed has soared in recent decades relative to 
the payroll-employed, violating a key assumption underlying the headline 
measure.15
It is important to note, however, that the measures of the labor share that 
we consider also have much in common. In terms of long-run movements, 
table 1 shows that all measures indicate a substantial decline in labor’s 
share since the late 1980s. In terms of short-term fluctuations, figures 1 and 
3 reveal that all measures are countercyclical, with the share rising during 
recessions and falling during expansions.16
A convenient aspect of the common movements in the U.S. labor share 
measures is that they are mirrored by similar fluctuations in the payroll 
share (see figure 1 and row 1 of table 1). Consequently, an understanding 
of movements in the U.S. labor share can be gleaned by accounting for 
the drivers of the payroll share, which is comparatively straightforward to 
measure, and can also be disaggregated, for example by industry. This is 
the task of the next section.
II. The Composition of Economic Activity
The previous section examined the empirical behavior of the labor share 
from an aggregate perspective. It established that the bulk of the recent 
decline in the labor share can be traced back to a decline in the aggregate 
payroll share. That broad description, however, veils the underlying dis-
aggregate origins of movements in the aggregate payroll share. In this sec-
tion we take a more microeconomic perspective by exploiting data on the 
sectoral composition of labor compensation and production. This allows us 
to shed light on (i) the degree of heterogeneity in the levels of, and changes 
in, payroll shares across sectors; (ii) systematic movements in the sectoral 
15. In light of this, we suggest that the BLS adjust its headline labor share estimate to 
align more closely with either of the two alternative measures considered above. A quarterly 
estimate of the MFP share would be preferable to be consistent with the MFP data cur-
rently published by the BLS. This would imply a different path of average compensation 
per hour—it would grow faster after the 1980s. One could continue to produce the current 
compensation per hour measure and rename it “payroll compensation per hour.” In addition, 
the BLS could publish payroll hours as well as the payroll share in addition to the labor 
share. All these data already are part of current calculations but are simply not included in 
the official release.
16. A result of these long- and short-run properties is that none of the measures is esti-
mated to be stationary around a constant mean. Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots and KPSS 
tests for mean stationarity suggest that all three measures of the labor share in figure 3 are 
not mean-stationary.
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composition of the U.S. economy; and (iii) the way the interaction of 
(i) and (ii) affects movements in the aggregate payroll share.
II.A. Decomposing the Decline in the Payroll Share
Our starting point is the simple observation that the aggregate payroll 
share, lP
 
in the above notation, is the value-added weighted sum of the 
payroll shares of each of the industries in the economy:
W L
PY
P i
P
i
P
i
i i
P
i
∑ ∑λ ≡ = ω λ(3) ,
where wi ≡ PiYi /PY is the value-added share of sector i, and lPi ≡ WPiLPi /PiYi 
is its payroll share. It is possible to measure each of the components of 
equation 3 using the industry accounts from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. Data by detailed industry are available at an annual frequency 
from 1948 to 1987 under the SIC72 industry classification, and from 1987 
onward based on the NAICS02 coding.17
Figure 5 depicts the evolution of the cross-industry distribution of pay-
roll shares over the postwar period. Consistent with equation 3, the dis-
tribution is weighted by value added so that its mean replicates the path 
of the aggregate payroll share illustrated in figure 1. A key impression of 
figure 5 is that the magnitude of the variation in the aggregate payroll share 
(the mean) is dwarfed by the variation in these shares across industries. 
For example, in the most recent data, industries at the 25th percentile of 
total value added have a payroll share of around 30 percent while the cor-
responding number for the 75th percentile is around 70 percent.
In light of this cross-industry variation, it is remarkable that the aggre-
gate share has remained as stable as it has, given the large shift in the 
composition of U.S. economic activity—for example, from manufacturing 
17. SIC72 is the 1972 vintage of the Standard Industry Classification, and NAICS02 
is the 2002 vintage of the North American Industry Classification System. We use detailed 
data for 59 SIC72 industries and 60 NAICS02 industries. The GDP-by-industry data do not 
distinguish between nonprofit institutions serving households (NISHs) and businesses. As 
a result, the data include the compensation of NISH employees. To make the data for our 
analysis as comparable to the nonfarm business sector as possible, we took compensation for 
all industries excluding farms from the GDP-by-industry data and then rescaled both com-
pensation and value added for each industry such that they aggregate to that of the nonfarm 
business sector. Details are available in the online appendix. (Online appendixes for papers 
in this volume may be found at the Brookings Papers website, www.brookings.edu/bpea, 
under “Past Editions.”)
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to services—over the postwar period. This observation echoes Keynes’ 
sentiment that the “remarkable constancy” of the aggregate labor share is 
“a bit of a miracle” (1939, p. 49). This miraculous constancy of the payroll 
share is the outcome of movements across industries offsetting one another 
in subtle ways. To demonstrate this, table 2 implements a “shift-share” 
analysis of the change in the aggregate payroll share. Using equation (3), 
one can decompose changes in the aggregate share into two components:
     
P
i i
P
i i i
P
i∑ ∑∆λ = ω ∆λ + ∆ω λ(4) .
Shift Share
The “shift” component summarizes the contributions of changes in within-
sector payroll shares DlPi to the change in the aggregate payroll share. The 
“share” component reports the contributions of changes in sectoral com-
position Dwi. Due to a change in industry coding in 1987, we perform the 
analysis separately for the periods before and after this break. For the sake 
of brevity, we present the results obtained at the major sector level using 
Figure 5. cross-industry Distribution of Payroll share, 1948–2011 
Percent
1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and authors’ calculations.
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the unweighted averages of w and l as the expansion point for the decom-
position, though neither choice affects the results materially.
The first three columns of table 2 confirm the familiar observation that 
the composition of U.S. economic activity has shifted away from manu-
facturing toward services. The combined value added share of manufac-
turing (both durable and nondurable) and trade, transportation and utilities 
declined by a total of 18.1 and 10.5 percentage points, respectively, 
between 1948 and 1987 and between 1987 and 2011. This loss is almost 
exactly mirrored by the gains in three service sectors: financial activities; 
professional and business services; and education and health services. The 
impact of the changing composition of economic activity on the payroll 
share is summarized in the share-part of the shift-share analysis.
In table 2, panel A reports results for the earlier period, 1948 to 1987. 
During that period, payroll shares in the services sector tended to be smaller 
than in manufacturing. Therefore, everything else equal, the shift in activity 
from manufacturing to services would have resulted in a 2.7-percentage-
point decline in the labor share over that period, the “share” component of 
panel A. This decline did not manifest itself, however—the payroll share in 
fact increased by 0.9 percentage points between 1948 and 1987. The reason 
is that the effect of the change in the composition of economic activity was 
offset by an increase in within-sector payroll shares, particularly in the ser-
vice sectors, the “shift” part of panel A. Absent coincidental movements 
in sectoral composition, the aggregate payroll share would have risen by 
3.5 percentage points between 1948 and 1987. It is these coincidental 
movements that resulted in the “miraculous” relative constancy of the labor 
share in the first four decades of the postwar period.
Such coincidental movements did not take place between 1987 and 
2011. This can be seen from panel B of table 2. This demonstrates that, 
between 1987 and 2011, the transition from manufacturing to services has 
had little impact in aggregate.18 The reason is that payroll shares by major 
sector have converged in recent decades, so that compositional shifts have 
been broadly offsetting.19 What has driven the decline in the aggregate 
payroll share has been the decline in the fraction of income paid to workers 
in manufacturing, trade, transportation, and utilities. These are the sectors 
18. A point also made by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013). Estrada and Valdeolivas 
(2012) show that the same is true for France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United 
Kingdom.
19. What has increased is the within-major-sector variation in labor shares across 
detailed industries. This is why figure 5 does not show a large decline in the cross-industry 
variation in payroll shares.
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with a large negative contribution to the “shift” part of the shift-share 
analysis.
The results in table 2 provide an important insight, namely that the recent 
trend decline in the aggregate payroll share is due mostly to declines in 
payroll shares within particular industries. Thus, understanding the sources 
of the decline in the aggregate payroll share requires understanding the 
declines in the payroll shares of individual industries.
II.B. Cyclical Fluctuations in the Payroll Share
Although our primary focus is on trend movements in the labor share, 
our analysis of disaggregated industry data also uncovers striking regulari-
ties in the movements of the payroll share at higher frequencies.
One regularity that stands out is that the cyclical movements in the 
aggregate payroll share apparent in figure 1 are accounted for entirely by 
cyclical fluctuations within industries; changes in industry composition are 
immaterial for these high-frequency fluctuations. To establish this, table 3 
uses equation (4) to motivate a decomposition of the variance of changes 
in the aggregate payroll share (as opposed to the decomposition of long 
differences in table 2). Since the variance is dominated by high-frequency 
variation, this provides a sense of the sectoral origins of the cyclical varia-
tion in the payroll share. Table 3 reveals that, for both subsamples, the 
“shift” part of the variance decomposition contributes essentially all of the 
Table 3. Variance Decomposition of annual changes in the aggregate Payroll share, 
1948–2011
Major sector
SIC 1949–87 NAICS 1987–2011
Total Shift Share Total Shift Share
Nonfarm business sector 100 102 -2 100 109 -9
Natural resources and mining 4 -1 5 1 -1 2
Construction 10 5 5 13 7 6
Durable goods manufacturing 33 36 -3 16 19 -3
Non-durable goods manufacturing 9 11 -2 3 8 -5
Trade/Transportation and utilities 24 28 -5 15 20 -5
Information 5 5 0 10 17 -7
Financial activities 3 10 -7 11 15 -4
Professional and business services 5 3 2 29 13 17
Education and health services 3 2 2 -5 3 -8
Leisure and hospitality 1 1 0 4 5 -1
Other services 2 2 1 2 3 0
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations.
Note: Percentage-point contributions to the variance of changes in the aggregate payroll share.
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variance. Additionally, for all sectors except mining (which includes oil 
and gas extraction), the contribution of the shift component is positive. 
This indicates that for all these sectors, changes in individual payroll share 
move in the same direction as in the aggregate.
As noted in the previous section, a conspicuous aberration from the 
recent trend decline in lP is the large rise and fall observed at the turn of 
the 21st century. Given its timing, one might naturally conjecture that this 
episode was caused by the tech bubble that emerged at the time. In par-
ticular, analyses by Mehran and Tracy (2001) and Himmelberg and others 
(2004) suggest that the extensive use of stock options in the compensa-
tion of employees in the tech and investment banking industries substan-
tially affected compensation and profits measures in the national accounts 
between 1998 and 2003. As Moylan (2008) explains, stock options gener-
ally are counted as part of compensation only when employees exercise 
them.20 Many tech and investment banking employees decided to exercise 
their options at the height of the tech bubble, propping up the payroll shares 
in tech and investment banking.21
To discern the effect of these stock options, we calculate the contribu-
tions to the aggregate payroll share accounted for by the changes in pay-
roll shares of a small set of industries that cover the investment banking 
and tech sectors.22 Together, these industries account for about 7 percent 
of nonfarm business value added. The results of this analysis are remark-
able. Figure 6 plots the annual percentage-point change in the aggregate 
payroll share from 1988 onwards, together with the contribution of invest-
ment banking and tech. Despite these two sectors’ small share in total value 
added, their contributions are substantial. Roughly half of the rise and sub-
sequent fall in the aggregate payroll share between 1998 and 2003 can be 
attributed to changes in the payroll shares in these sectors alone. A similar 
story holds for the period surrounding the Great Recession, though with a 
20. Unfortunately, separate data on compensation in the form of stock options are not 
available in the NIPA, because the source data from the IRS do not distinguish that part of 
compensation from regular wages and salaries.
21. For example, the payroll share in computer and electronic products (334) increased 
from 75 percent in 1996 to 112 percent in 2000, and the payroll share in information and data 
processing services (514) peaked at 181 percent in 2000.
22. The detailed industries for the tech sector include computer and electronic prod-
ucts (334); electrical equipment, appliances, and components (335); publishing industries 
(includes software) (511); information and data processing services (514); and computer 
systems design and related services (5415). For investment banking, we focus on securities 
and investments (523).
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greater role played by investment banking than by the tech sectors, as one 
would expect.
Thus, mirroring the origins of the trend decline in the payroll share, 
movements in the share in individual industries also drive a large part of 
the cyclical movements in the aggregate. The striking lesson of figure 6 
is that even very tightly defined sectors can experience such large swings 
in payroll shares that they leave a clear imprint on the evolution of these 
shares in the aggregate.
III. The Structure of Aggregate Technology
So far, we have limited ourselves to a quantitative description of what 
accounts for the movements of the U.S. labor share in the nonfarm business 
sector. In this section and the next we consider possible explanations for 
declines in the labor share. Our focus in this section is on models of aggre-
gate technology that potentially give rise to such movements.
Percentage point
Annual data
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Values are shift-contributions to percentage-point changes in payroll share.  
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Figure 6. contributions of changes in Payroll shares in tech and investment banking 
to aggregate, 1988–2012
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To fix ideas, we begin by investigating the simplest possible model in 
which movements in the labor share can be understood. Our point of depar-
ture, then, is the neoclassical theory of distribution for an economy com-
prising firms that operate in competitive product and factor markets and are 
endowed with a given technology. The historical stability of labor’s share 
has informed the widespread assumption in much of macroeconomics that 
a Cobb-Douglas technology applies. Thus, the focus of this section will be 
to assess the promise of alternative structures of technology in their ability 
to account for recent movements in labor’s share.
Before we delve further into the analysis, it is worthwhile to note the 
economic significance of such a neoclassical explanation, namely that it 
suggests that movements in factor shares are potentially informative on 
the structure of production and the nature of technical progress in the 
economy, two fundamental ingredients of macroeconomics.
III.A. The Role of Capital-Labor Substitutability
We start by investigating simple aggregative models. Imagine an economy 
endowed with a constant-returns-to-scale aggregate production function 
Y = F (AKK, ALL). Here, K is capital, L is labor (hours worked), and techni-
cal progress may be either capital-augmenting (AK) or labor-augmenting 
(AL). Note that this nests both Harrod-neutral (purely labor-augmenting, 
AK ≡ 1) and Hicks-neutral (equally capital- and labor-augmenting, AK ≡ AL) 
technical change as special cases. These assumptions on the structure of 
production allow one to express labor’s share as
wL
Y
w
A f kL )(
λ ≡ =(5) ,
where w is the real wage, k ≡ (AKK)/(ALL) is the ratio of efficiency units 
of capital to efficiency units of labor, and f (k) ≡ F (k, 1). Furthermore, 
if real wages and the rental rate on capital are determined competitively, 
then
w
Y
L
A f k k f k r Y
K
A f kL K[ ]( ) ( ) ( )= ∂∂ = − ′ =
∂
∂ = ′(6) , and .
Thus, we can write labor’s share as
k k f kf k k( )
( )
( ) ( )λ = −
′
≡ − α(7) 1 1 .
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Due to the presence of competitive product markets, the remainder a(k) 
is of course capital’s share.
Two key implications emerge from this simple model: First, labor’s 
share is a function solely of the capital-labor ratio expressed in efficiency 
units, k. Second, it is determined exclusively by the structure of production 
embodied in f(). It follows that, in this simple economy, the labor share can 
move over time if technology is not isoelastic (that is, not Cobb-Douglas), 
and the ratio of efficiency units of capital to efficiency units of labor k 
moves over time.
Since Hicks (1932), it has been well understood that the relationship 
between the labor share l and the effective capital-labor ratio k can be 
linked generally to the elasticity of substitution between effective capital 
and labor, which we shall denote s:
d k
d F F k
d k
d k
k( ) ( )
( ) ( )σ = = +
− λ
λ


 ′λ
−
(8) ln
ln
1 1
1
ln
ln
1as 0.
2 1
1
 
Thus, the labor share l (k) is predicted to decrease in k whenever the elas-
ticity of substitution is greater than one (and vice versa). Put another way, 
whenever effective labor and capital are more substitutable than implied 
by a Cobb-Douglas production function, the labor share will decline in the 
effective capital-labor ratio k.
Eighty years after Hicks’ insight, Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) 
revived this notion as a potential explanation of the evidence they pre-
sent for secular declines in the global labor share. Based on cross-country 
variation, they infer estimates of the elasticity of substitution in the neigh-
borhood of s = 1.25.23 Importantly, however, the presence of an elasticity 
of substitution different from one is not a sufficient condition for generat-
ing long-run movements in labor’s share. For example, a standard result is 
that purely labor-augmenting technical change will imply that the effective 
capital-labor ratio k will be constant along a balanced-growth path, and 
thus so will the labor share, regardless of the elasticity of substitution.24 
The key to this story is the generation of long-run movements in capital 
23. By contrast, Antras (2004) and Chirinko (2008) suggest estimates of sigma in the 
range 0.4 to 0.6.
24. Movements in labor’s share could arise from transitional dynamics around the bal-
anced growth path in this case, however.
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intensity; in the case of s >1, it is necessary for the effective capital-labor 
ratio to trend upward.
Neoclassical theory suggests two potential sources for capital deep-
ening of this sort. The first is through capital-augmenting technical 
progress—that is, if AK in the above notation grows over time. A sec-
ond channel is through investment-specific technical change driven by 
reductions in the relative price of investment associated with efficiency 
gains in the production of new capital goods (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and 
Krusell 1997). Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) highlight the latter as 
a particularly promising candidate explanation for the decline in labor’s 
share.
A great virtue of the simple neoclassical framework is that it delivers a 
rich set of empirical predictions on the joint evolution of labor’s share, fac-
tor prices, and productivity. These predictions can be confronted with the 
wealth of available data to assess the ability of this explanation to account 
for the evolution of labor’s share in the United States.
To demonstrate this, we begin with a simple observation. It is apparent 
from the alternative series in figure 3 that labor’s share has not trended 
downward throughout the postwar era. Despite some differences across 
measures, the strongest evidence of a decline emerges after the 1980s. 
(This, of course, is why the proposed stability of the labor share has been 
such a robust stylized fact of macroeconomics.) Thus, for the decline 
of labor’s share to be a manifestation of the structure of production and 
the nature of technical progress requires that one or both of these have 
changed at some point in time. This simple observation has interesting 
implications for the process by which a decline in labor’s share will 
emerge.
A first corollary is a qualitative one. As the preceding discussion demon-
strates, if s >1, the key to a shrinking labor share must be traced to a form 
of capital deepening—that is, the capital-labor ratio in efficiency units k 
must grow. But neoclassical theory also predicts that growth in k will be 
associated with other adjustments in the economy. An important example in 
the U.S. context is that, for a given growth rate of labor-augmenting tech-
nical progress, both output-per-hour Y/L = AL f (k) and real wages w = AL 
[ f (k) - kf ′(k)] will be predicted to grow faster. And, consistent with a 
declining labor share, the additional growth in output per hour will outstrip 
the additional growth in real wages. 
Figure 7 confronts this prediction with the path of real compensation per 
hour and output per hour experienced in the U.S. economy. Specifically, 
it plots the growth rates of these variables as measured by the BLS Labor 
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Productivity and Costs program for the nonfarm business sector.25 The 
growth rate of the labor share, of course, is simply the difference between 
growth in hourly compensation and output per hour. All series are plotted 
as 10-year centered moving averages to smooth out high-frequency varia-
tion associated with business cycles, short-run adjustment dynamics, and 
so forth.
The decomposition of the decline in labor’s share in figure 7 suggests 
that the experience of the United States in recent decades is only partly 
Log points
Quarterly observations
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Note: Values are 10-year centered moving averages of annualized growth rates. Real wages deflated 
using the NFB output deflator. 
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Figure 7. growth of real hourly compensation and output per hour in the nonfarm 
business sector, 1953–2008
25. Bosworth and Perry (1994) point out the sensitivity of the trend properties of the real 
wage compared to average labor productivity with respect to the deflator being used for the 
real wage. We use the nonfarm business output deflator here. Using the CPI or PCE deflator 
would result in slower real wage growth since the 1980s and only strengthen the point we 
make.
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consistent with a neoclassical story based on an elasticity of substitution in 
excess of one together with capital deepening. Viewed through this lens, 
two distinct episodes are apparent. The decline in the labor share from 
the 1980s to the mid-1990s was characterized in part by a period of rising 
growth in the late 1980s during which growth in average labor productiv-
ity surpassed hourly compensation growth, consistent with the neoclassical 
story above.
By contrast, however, the substantial recent decline in the labor share 
that emerged at the turn of the 21st century appears wholly due to a slow-
down in growth marked by a profound, and unprecedentedly sharp, stagna-
tion of hourly compensation growth. This important feature of the recent 
U.S. experience appears hard to reconcile with a simple story based on the 
structure of production and technical change.
In addition to this qualitative observation, the simple theoretical analysis 
above also highlights quantitative implications of the timing of the decline 
in labor’s share. Rearranging equation 8 provides a tight link between the 
elasticity of substitution s and the magnitude of the response of labor’s 
share to the effective capital-labor ratio k:
d d k( )λ = − − λ σ −
σ
(9) ln 1 1 ln .
Evaluating the latter at a value of s = 1.25 and a reasonable value for 
labor’s share, say l = 0.6, suggests a d ln l(k)/d ln k of around -0.08. Thus, 
to generate an 8-percent decline in the labor share—which is about the 
magnitude seen in the data—it is necessary for the capital-labor ratio in 
efficiency units, k, to double. If, as neoclassical theory suggests, the latter is 
the outcome of either capital-augmenting or investment-specific technical 
progress, growth in the capital-labor ratio K/L will be predicted to acceler-
ate for a given growth rate of labor-augmenting technical progress.
This suggests an additional simple check on the neoclassical account 
for movements in labor’s share, namely to confront this prediction with the 
empirical behavior of modern estimates of the capital-labor ratio. Figure 8 
implements this using the real-time growth accounting data recently devel-
oped by Fernald (2012).26
Fernald provides a measure of capital input constructed from an aggre-
gate of individual measures of heterogeneous capital goods based on 
26. The estimates in Fernald (2012) are for the business sector rather than the nonfarm 
business sector.
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the perpetual inventory method. Consistent with firm optimization, the 
aggregate capital stock is measured as a service-flow-weighted sum of 
the stocks of each type of capital, where the weights are based on user 
cost estimates for each type.
Figure 8 plots the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio implied by Fer-
nald’s measure of capital input and the BLS Labor Productivity and Costs 
measure of hours worked for the business sector. Again, series are plotted 
as 10-year centered moving averages to highlight medium-run variation. 
It is clear from figure 8 that there have been periods of elevated growth 
in the capital-labor ratio. However, the timing of these periods of capital 
deepening does not align straightforwardly with the timing of movements 
in labor’s share. Although the 1990s witnessed significant growth in K/L, 
the period since 2000, during which labor’s share has fallen substantially, 
has instead been marked by a considerable slowdown in growth in capital 
intensity.
Log points
Quarterly observations
Source: Fernald (2012). 
Note: Values are 10-year centered moving averages of annualized growth rates.
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Figure 8. growth of capital-labor ratio and investment-specific technological change 
in the business sector, 1952–2007
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For a given rate of labor-augmenting technical progress, then, the paths 
of real wages, productivity, and the capital-labor ratio since 2000 diverge 
from the paths implied by an account of the decline in labor’s share based 
on capital deepening. A potential reconciliation, of course, is that the rate 
of labor-augmenting technical progress fell since 2000. Two considerations 
add a note of caution to that interpretation. First, any such declines in the 
growth of AL would have to be so precipitous that they more than offset the 
acceleration of growth in the effective capital-labor ratio k at the heart of 
the capital deepening story. Second, measures of investment-specific tech-
nological change have exhibited a similar slowdown since 2000. Figure 8 
reveals that, although the initial acceleration in investment-specific tech-
nological change coincided with the onset of the decline in the labor share, 
the acceleration of the decline in the labor share over the last decade was 
not accompanied by an acceleration in investment-specific technological 
change. On the contrary, investment-specific technological change slowed 
down during the latter period.
The evidence suggests that the origins of the falling labor share in 
the United States do not dovetail easily with the neoclassical theory 
of distribution based on a simple aggregate production function. This has 
two possible implications: Either neoclassical theory is unable to provide 
a coherent account of the decline in labor’s share, or a simple aggregate 
production function is too crude to capture the relevant economic forces. 
In the remainder of this section, we explore the latter by investigating the 
potential role of richer production structures and factor heterogeneity.
III.B.  Skill-Biased Technological Change  
and Capital-Skill Complementarity
The simple aggregative benchmark analyzed above makes strong assump-
tions about the nature of the production process. A prominent example is its 
abstraction from heterogeneity in capital and labor, for example by vintage 
and by skill. There are empirical reasons to suspect that such heterogene-
ities have played an important role in recent decades in the U.S. economy. 
In particular, the substantial growth in wage inequality in the United States 
since the early 1980s has motivated two prominent and related hypotheses 
on the structure of technology.
The first hypothesis concerns skill-biased technical change, based on 
the notion that technical progress particularly augments the productiv-
ity of high-skilled workers relative to the low-skilled, yielding rising 
wage inequality (Bound and Johnson 1992; Katz and Murphy 1992). 
The second hypothesis, based on capital-skill complementarity, explores 
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the possibility that the elasticity of substitution between capital and skilled 
labor is less than that between capital and unskilled labor (Griliches 1969; 
Berman, Bound, and Griliches 1994). Applied to the case at hand, declines 
in the relative price of new investment goods since the 1980s could have 
stimulated capital deepening and thereby an increased skill premium due 
to capital-skill complementarity (Krusell and others 2000).
In isolation, neither explanation provides an obvious account for a 
decline in the labor share. Skill-biased technical change can arise even 
in the presence of constant factor shares (for example, a Cobb-Douglas 
technology between capital and a constant-elasticity-of-substitution aggre-
gate of labor by skill). Likewise, by operating through movements in 
the capital-labor ratio, the capital-skill complementarity story will affect 
the labor share for the same reasons noted in the subsection above—that 
is, if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor (regardless of 
skill) differs from unity. Indeed, in their quantitative analysis of capital-
skill complementarity, Krusell and others (2000) find very small effects on 
the labor share.
To see why, consider a constant-returns-to-scale aggregate production 
function with three factors, y = F (k, s, u), where capital k, skilled labor s, 
and unskilled labor u = 1 - s all are measured in units of effective labor. 
Mirroring equation (9), it is possible to show that labor’s share will move 
according to the following relation:
d d k
s
s
d s
s ks s ku
s ku s ks }
{[ ]( ) ( )
( )
λ = − − λ ω ρ + − ω ρ
+
−
− ω ρ − ω ρ


(10) ln 1 1 ln
1
1 ln ,
where rks ≡ (sks - 1)/sks and rku ≡ (sku - 1)/sks\u measure the degree of 
substitutability27 between capital and labor by skill, and ws is the skill share 
of labor income. Equation 10 reiterates the point that the effect of capital 
deepening on labor’s share in this more complicated environment mirrors 
those noted above in equation 9, where the overall degree of substitut-
27. The ss here correspond to the so-called Hicks direct partial elasticities of substitution 
for this case of three inputs. While the concept of elasticity of substitution becomes more 
complex with more than two inputs (indeed, a variety of measures has been proposed), prac-
tical implementations of capital-skill complementarity often have used production functions 
for which these distinctions do not matter (see, for example, the two-level CES specification 
used by Krusell and others 2000).
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ability between capital and labor takes the form of a weighted average of 
rks and rku.
What is new is that changes in the skill mix of the labor force can cause 
the labor share to move in the presence of capital-skill complementarity 
(rks < rku). Possible reasons for such a change include growth in the supply 
of highly educated workers and skill-biased technical change.
The magnitudes of such effects of “skill deepening” could be substan-
tial. For example, Acemoglu and Autor (2011) present estimates of relative 
weekly wages and supply for college- versus high school-educated workers 
using March Current Population Survey data for the years 1963 to 2008. 
These estimates suggest that the share of college-educated workers (in effi-
ciency units) s rose by around 75 log points over this period, and average 
values for the skill share of labor income and relative supply of around 
ws ≈ 0.5 and s/(1 - s) ≈ 1. Krusell and others (2000) provide estimates of 
capital-skill complementarity parameters of about rks ≈ -0.5 and rku ≈ 0.4.
Combining these with a reasonable value for labor’s share, l = 0.6, 
suggests a contribution of skill deepening to a decline in l on the order of 
-0.4 × (1 × 0.5 × 0.4 + 0.5 × 0.5) × 75 = 13.5 log points, similar to the order 
of magnitude seen in the data.
Despite this, a difficulty with this line of reasoning relates to the timing 
of movements in the labor share. Figure 9 illustrates the point. Rises in the 
skill share of labor have occurred continually since the 1960s in the United 
States. Thus, the implied labor share, which is computed using a rolling 
year-by-year implementation of equation (10), is also predicted to fall con-
tinually throughout the sample period. As we have emphasized before, the 
reductions in the empirical labor share in figure 3 are concentrated after the 
1980s, preceded by relative trend stability, in contrast to the predictions of 
figure 9. Put another way, the United States has not experienced a sharp 
acceleration in the skill share of labor in recent decades in a manner con-
sistent with the timing of movements in the labor share.
III.C. Taking Stock
Our analysis of a range of neoclassical explanations suggests that 
they provide an incomplete account of the movements in the labor share 
observed in recent U.S. history. Simple aggregative stories based on a non-
unit elasticity of substitution between capital and labor face difficulties in 
explaining the joint movements in real wages, productivity, and capital-
labor ratios over the last few decades. Increases in the skill composition of 
the labor force combined with capital-skill complementarity have difficulty 
in replicating the peculiar timing of declines in the labor share.
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2013
Of course, our analysis does not definitively rule out the possibility that 
some other neoclassical explanation is able to fit the facts. What it does 
suggest, however, is that the canonical production structures that have been 
highlighted by recent and past literature fall short when confronted with 
the empirical movements in the U.S. labor share, especially those that have 
emerged during the last decade.
With an eye to the results of the analyses that follow, we close this 
section with a discussion of a different channel, namely the potential role 
of international trade in shaping movements in the labor share. We con-
tinue the theme adopted throughout this section of viewing the economy 
through the lens of an aggregate production function. Here, however, 
we abstract from technical change and focus instead on the role of 
inter mediate inputs imported from abroad. Thus, production is given by 
y = F (k,m), where y, k, and m respectively denote output, capital, and 
imported inputs per unit of labor. Note that we are interested in labor’s 
share of domestic income—that is, output net of payments to imported 
Implied labor share (λ) Skill share of labor
Source: Skill share of labor and implied path of labor share based on the estimates of Acemoglu and 
Autor (2011) and Krusell and others (2000). 
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factors. Under constant returns, the effect of increased use of imported 
intermediates is given by
)()(∂ λ∂ = − − λ µ ρ − ρ(11)
ln
ln
1 ,
m
lm km
where rlm and rkm index the substitutability28 of labor and capital with 
respect to imported inputs, and µ is the income share of m in gross output y. 
Taken from an aggregate perspective, then, increased import exposure will 
reduce labor’s share if imported intermediates are more substitutable with 
labor than they are with capital, rlm > rkm. Intuitively, imported intermediates 
will be expected to induce greater substitution away from labor than from 
capital in this case. Our examination of disaggregated data in the ensuing 
sections shows that there is something to that expectation. For now, though, 
we note that the timing of the recent expansion of trade with developing 
economies accords somewhat better with the timing of the trend decline in 
the labor share since the late 1980s relative to accounts based on capital 
deepening.29 In what follows, we show that there is a parallel link between 
these two trends in more disaggregated data. 
IV. Exploiting Cross-Industry Variation
Since the most common aggregate production function representations 
fail to match the recent path of the labor share, in this section we con-
sider several explanations that exploit cross-industry variation in payroll 
share declines documented in section II. We first revisit the investment-
specific technological change hypothesis from an industry perspective. 
Available data for the period 1987 to 2011 suggest that it is not the case 
that the industries that saw the smallest increases in equipment prices are 
also those with the highest payroll share declines. We then consider two 
alternative explanations for the declines in labor shares across industries: 
(i) declines in unionization, and (ii) increased import competition. Our 
data yield one robust correlation: that declines in payroll shares are more 
28. As before, here rij ≡ (sij - 1)/sij, and the ss are the Hicks direct partial elasticities 
of substitution.
29. A recent aberration to the general trend of increased trade has been the Great Reces-
sion, which was accompanied by a significant decline in trade, the so-called “trade collapse.” 
Nevertheless, this collapse has been almost entirely reversed since the recession; import 
penetration in the U.S. economy remains significantly above its pre-1990s level.
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severe in industries that face larger increases in competitive pressures 
from imports.
IV.A.  Investment-Specific Technical Change and Variation  
in Equipment Price Inflation
Our analysis in section 3 suggests a weak link between the decline in 
the labor share and investment-specific technical change. However, that 
analysis is based on a simple aggregate production function framework 
and could potentially be too crude to capture some of the changes in the 
production structure.
In this section, we instead exploit cross-industry variation to explore 
whether those industries experiencing the biggest declines in their payroll 
shares are also those that tend to invest in types of equipment whose prices 
increase more slowly. That is, if the decline in the payroll share is due to 
firms’ replacing workers with machines, then sectors that invest in types of 
equipment with slower price increases should see larger declines in their 
payroll shares.30 This would result in a positive relationship between the 
rate of equipment price increases and the change in the payroll share across 
industries.
Figure 10 plots this relationship using our data. On the horizontal axis 
is the average annual percent change in the price of equipment and soft-
ware an industry invests in for 1987 through 2011. These data are taken 
from the Fixed Asset Tables made available by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. On the vertical axis is the percentage-point change in an indus-
try’s payroll share between 1987 and 2011. We use the same sample of 
60 NAICS industries that underlies the post-1987 results in section II. We 
exclude oil and gas extraction from the sample, since movements in that 
industry’s payroll share are driven almost completely by changes in the 
price of oil. Industries in the scatterplot are split up into manufacturing (the 
squares) and nonmanufacturing (the circles). The size of each of the mark-
ers is proportional to the average value added share of the corresponding 
industry over the period 1987 to 2011. The dashed line is the weighted-
least-squares regression line, where the industries are weighted by their 
value added shares.
30. This is most often stated in the relative price of equipment (relative to output). Here 
we focus on the equipment price itself. Unreported results for the relative equipment price 
are qualitatively similar to the ones presented here.
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A first interesting observation from Figure 10 is that declines in both 
payroll shares and equipment prices were commonplace from 1987 to 
2011. Around three-quarters of industries experienced a decline in their 
payroll share; around half of them experienced a decline in the equipment 
investment price. However, substantial declines in equipment price have 
not always been associated with payroll share declines. For example, the 
three industries with the biggest investment price declines saw either a 
small decline, or even an increase, in their payroll share.
Consequently, as figure 10 shows, there is in fact a weak negative rela-
tionship between the change in equipment prices and payroll shares across 
industries. This is the opposite of what one would expect if capital deep-
ening due to the decline in price of equipment were the driving force of 
the decline in the payroll share. This evidence strengthens the findings of 
our aggregate analysis and suggests that a shift to more capital-intensive 
production methods to exploit declines in equipment prices has not been 
a major factor in the evolution of the payroll share over the past 25 years.
∆ Payroll share (percentage points), 1987–2011
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Data cover 59 NAICS sectors; size of circle/square reflects value added share. 
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Figure 10. equipment Price inflation and changes in Payroll shares by industry
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IV.B. Deunionization
An important change to the institutional structure of the U.S. labor mar-
ket has been the decline in unionization. The fraction of workers covered 
by a union or employee association contract in the private nonagricultural 
sector has shrunk by almost half, from 14.6 percent in 1987 to 7.7 percent 
in 2011.31
The bargaining power of unions tends to increase workers’ share of 
the surplus generated in the production process. For example, Hirsch 
(2012) estimates that union wage premiums in the private sector were 
about 25 percent in 1984.32 Given the existence of a substantial union 
wage premium, a large decline in union membership might be expected 
to result in a decline in the aggregate labor share. Such a decline would 
31. The unionization data we use are described in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003).
32. Hirsch (2012) finds that while there has been a modest downward trend in the union 
wage premium in the private sector, it still remained at around 20 percent in 2010.
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∆ Payroll share (percentage points), 1987–2011
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations. 
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–30
–20
–10
0
10
20
∆ Union coverage rate (percentage points), 1987–2011
Manufacturing
Non-manufacturing
Figure 11. Deunionization and changes in Payroll shares by industry
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Table 4. regressions identifying cross-industry Variation in changes in Payroll shares, 
1987–2011
Dependent variable: payroll 
share (%-point), 1987–2011 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5
Change in equipment price (%), 
1987–2011
-1.52
(0.78)
-1.03
(0.72)
-0.90
(0.74)
Change in unionization 
coverage rate (%-point), 
1987–2011
0.22
(0.14)
0.01
(0.13)
Change in import exposure 
(%-point), 1993–2010
-0.87***
(0.21)
-0.81***
(0.22)
-0.82**
(0.24)
R2 0.06 0.04 0.22 0.25 0.25
No. of observations 59 56 59 59 56
Note: Statistical significance levels: * p < 5 percent; ** p < 1 percent; *** p < 0.1 percent. All results 
are obtained using weighted least squares with an industry’s average value added share over 1987 to 
2011 as the weight.
in turn be expected to be concentrated in the industries with the largest 
declines in union coverage.
To explore this possibility, we make use of data on the change in union 
coverage rates by industry between 1987 and 2011. Figure 11 plots these 
data against the change in payroll shares. From the figure it can be seen 
that, although there is a positive correlation between the change in union-
ization and the change in payroll shares across industries, the relationship 
is weak. The weighted least squares regression (column 4.2 in table 4) indi-
cates that cross-industry variation in changes in unionization rates explains 
less than 5 percent of the variation in changes in payroll shares across 
industries. Though statistically insignificant, at 0.22, the point estimate of 
the effect of deunionization on the payroll share implies that in this simple 
regression deunionization can explain 1.5 percentage points of the drop in 
the aggregate payroll share.
IV.C. Globalization: The Role of Rising Imports
There has been a substantial increase in imports in the United States in 
the last few decades.33 Part of this rise is a consequence of vertical spe-
cialization, which occurs when countries specialize in particular stages of 
a good’s production sequence, rather than in the production of the entire 
good, as discussed by Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) and Yi (2003). In this 
33. The ratio of imports to GDP went up from 10 percent in 1993 to around 16 percent 
in 2010.
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subsection, we investigate the potential effects of such offshoring on recent 
trends in the U.S. labor share.
At the close of section III we noted that increased import penetration 
would be expected to depress labor’s share of domestic income if imported 
intermediates were more substitutable with labor than with capital from the 
perspective of an aggregate production technology. From a microeconomic 
viewpoint, there are at least two channels by which such an effect could 
emerge. The first is reminiscent of the capital-labor substitutability hypoth-
esis outlined in section III, except that movements in capital intensity are 
envisioned as the outcome of international trade.34 Standard comparative 
advantage arguments imply that, when firms segment the production pro-
cess, they will shift constituent parts to foreign countries with comparative 
advantage in the production of those specified parts. In many industrial-
ized countries, including the United States, this shift has taken the form of 
moving the production of labor-intensive intermediate and final goods to 
labor-abundant countries with lower labor costs (see, for example, Feenstra 
and Hanson 1996a, 1999). By offshoring the more labor-intensive part of 
U.S. production, the remaining production in the U.S. economy would be 
expected to become more capital intensive. If, in addition, capital is more 
than unit-elastic with respect to labor, Hicks’ (1932) result will imply that 
the U.S. labor share will fall.
It is worth noting that this account is plausibly consistent with declines 
in labor shares not only in source countries, such as the U.S., but also in the 
destination countries to which production is offshored, such as China. This 
is important if, as Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) suggest, declines in 
labor’s share have occurred globally. In particular, it is possible that off-
shored production processes that are labor-intensive by U.S. standards also 
are capital-intensive relative to existing production in China. And, indeed, 
there are precedents for this type of result in prior literature. Feenstra and 
Hanson (1996b), for example, note the importance of increased capital 
flows from the United States to Mexico in reconciling wage movements 
associated with offshoring between these two economies.
A difficulty with this first trade-based explanation, however, is that it 
faces the same challenges associated with other accounts based on capital 
deepening, namely that the timing of such deepening in the United States 
does not accord well with the timing of the decline in labor’s share (see 
34. Of course, it is also possible that the processes of technical change emphasized in 
section III and the increased penetration of imports of intermediate goods emphasized here 
are linked.
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figure 8). The second possible trade-based channel that we highlight does 
not rely on shifts in capital intensity, but instead takes as its point of depar-
ture the abundant evidence for inter-industry wage differentials documented 
by Dickens and Katz (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1988), among 
others. Viewed from this perspective, industry differences in labor shares 
have a more prosaic interpretation: Industries with high shares are those for 
which labor is expensive relative to its average productivity. It is natural 
to posit that these elements of the production structure would be particu-
larly sensitive to import exposure, leading to a lowering of labor’s share in 
such sectors. Again, note that this explanation is amenable to the possibility 
that labor’s share will also fall in offshoring destination economies. If, for 
example, offshored wages are determined in part by low market wages in 
the destination country and average labor productivity is determined in part 
by superior technologies from developed source economies, it is natural to 
imagine that offshored production units will have labor shares that are low 
relative to elsewhere in the destination economy.
In what follows, we assess the role of increased competition that U.S. 
workers are facing due to rising imports, leaving aside the important ques-
tion of identifying the underlying economic channel for future work. To 
do so, we compute what we call import exposure for each of the industries 
that we consider. We make that computation by posing the following ques-
tion: If the United States were to produce domestically all the goods that it 
imports,35 how much additional value added would each industry have to 
produce? For example, if all U.S. imports of clothes were produced domes-
tically, how much would value added increase in sectors like retail, textile 
manufacturing, and so on.
To be able to calculate this measure of import exposure we use the 
annual input-output matrices that are available for the years 1993 to 2010 
from the BLS. Import exposure is expressed as the percentage increase in 
value added needed to satisfy U.S. final demand if the United States would 
produce all its imports domestically.36
Figure 12 plots the relationship between changes in import exposure 
and changes in the payroll shares for our sample of industries. The figure 
35. At current factor prices and productivity levels.
36. In terms of input-output terminology, our measure of import exposure is the percent-
age difference between total domestic requirements and total requirements for an industry. 
One important aspect this measure does not capture is international round-aboutness of trade, 
where U.S. exports are used as intermediate inputs abroad for the production of goods that 
then end up being imported into the United States.
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indicates that import exposure increased for almost all the industries; the 
aggregate pattern is not driven by a few sectors. It also reveals that those 
industries that faced the biggest rises in their import exposure also tended 
to experience the largest declines in their payroll share. Column 4.3 
in table 4 shows that the weighted least squares regression behind the 
plotted regression line is significant at the 0.1 percent level. It implies 
that the variation in the change in import exposure explains 22 percent of 
the cross-industry variation in payroll-share changes.
The final column of table 4 contains the results of a multivariate regres-
sion that jointly evaluates the quantitative importance of the three poten-
tial explanations considered in this section: investment-specific technical 
change, deunionization, and globalization. This shows that the effect of 
increased import competition on payroll shares across industries is robust 
to the inclusion of the other two explanatory variables. Moreover, once 
the change in import exposure is included the coefficient on the change in 
union coverage rates becomes effectively zero. This suggests that those sec-
∆ Payroll share (percentage points), 1987–2011
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and authors’ calculations. 
Note: Data cover 59 NAICS sectors; size of circle/square reflects value added share. 
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tors where deunionization was most prevalent are also sectors that saw the 
biggest increase in import exposure. The residual variation in the change in 
unionization rates does not explain much of the decline in the labor share.
Of course, this analysis is based on a set of simple cross-industry regres-
sions and is thus subject to many caveats. Still, our results indicate a cross-
industry link between the increases in import exposure and the decline 
in the labor share.37 While this result cannot be interpreted as causal, it is 
worth noting that the statistical relationship between import exposure and 
payroll shares across industries is large enough to account for a substan-
tial fraction of the aggregate trend decline in the labor share. In particular, 
aggregating the results of the weighted-least-squares regression reported 
in column 4.3 of table 4 across industries suggests that increases in the 
import exposure of U.S. businesses can account for 3.3 percentage points 
of the 3.9 percentage point decline in the U.S. payroll share over the past 
quarter century.38 This suggests that a particularly fruitful avenue for future 
research will be to delve further into the causal channels that underlie this 
statistical relationship, in particular the possibility that the decline in the 
U.S. labor share was driven by the offshoring of the labor-intensive com-
ponent of the U.S. supply chain.
V. Practical Implications and Future Developments
In the previous four sections we uncovered the main facts behind and 
explanations for the decline in the U.S. labor share. We conclude by con-
sidering whether these facts and explanations warrant a major rethinking 
of how the labor share is used in empirical macroeconomics. In addition, 
with these factors and explanations in mind, we discuss what might drive 
movements in the labor share in the foreseeable future.
V.A. Reconsidering the Use and Interpretation of the Labor Share
In applied macroeconomics there are three important uses of the labor 
share. We discuss each of these separately in this subsection.
37. We are not the first to highlight the potential role of globalization and openness 
to trade: see, for example, Guscina (2006), Harrison (2005), Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) 
and Böckerman and Maliranta (2011). More recently, Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) have 
established the important role of import competition in shaping local labor market outcomes 
in the United States.
38. This 3.3-percentage-point estimate is computed from the point estimate 0.87 times 
the value added weighted average increase in import exposure across industries.
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Factor incoMe share The most straightforward interpretation of the 
labor share is as a measure of the distribution of income between the pro-
ductive factors of capital and labor. It is in this context that Kaldor (1957, 
1961) suggests that constancy of the share is a reasonable approximation to 
the data that should be replicated by models of economic growth. In prac-
tice, the relative constancy of the labor share has often been interpreted as 
an endorsement of the use of a Cobb-Douglas representation of aggregate 
technology in growth models. Of course, the use of a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function does not explain the relative constancy of factor shares; it 
simply postulates it.
The problem with gauging whether movements in the labor share dis-
pel the stylized fact of constancy is that, as Solow (1958, p. 618) puts it, 
“The literature does not abound in precise definitions, but obviously literal 
constancy is not in question.” So, are the recent movements in the U.S. 
labor share of an order of magnitude that would justify reconsidering the 
assumption of approximate constancy of factor shares? The answer to this 
question depends on the context to which the labor share is applied as a 
measure of factor shares.
The most common application of factor income shares is in growth and 
development accounting, in particular in the measurement of TFP. In its 
simplest form, TFP growth is the difference between output growth, d ln Y, 
and a factor-income-share-weighted average of the growth rates of labor, 
d ln Y, and capital, d ln K.
Suppose that the true labor share is l but that the measured share used 
for the growth-accounting exercise is l* = l + e. In that case, measured 
TFP growth, d ln TFP*, equals
( )
( )
= − λ − − λ
= + ε −
(12) ln * ln * ln 1 * ln
ln ln ln .
d TFP d Y d L d K
d TFP d K d L
This differs from actual TFP growth, d ln TFP, by an amount equal to 
the measurement error, e, times the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio. 
The latter is depicted in figure 8 and averages 2.27 percent over the post-
war period. Thus, if one were to use an estimate of the labor share consis-
tently 5 percentage points higher than the actual share—around the order 
of magnitude of the recent decline—then, on average, one would obtain an 
estimate of annual TFP growth just 0.11 percentage points higher than its 
true counterpart.
To put into perspective the assumption of constancy of the labor share 
in this context, we recalculate Fernald’s (2012) measure of TFP growth 
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with the labor share held constant at its postwar average. Figure 13 plots 
both the time-varying and constant labor shares used in these calculations, 
as well as the two implied measures of TFP growth constructed using these 
two labor share measures. As can be seen from the figure, to all intents and 
purposes both measures of TFP growth are the same.39
Therefore, in spite of the recent decline in the labor share, it is important 
to bear in mind that there remain prominent applications, such as growth 
and development accounting, for which these movements do not make an 
appreciable difference.
the bUsiness cycle, MarKUPs, anD resoUrce slacK There are many theo-
retical and empirical applications that emphasize and exploit the cyclical 
Log points
Quarterly observations
Percent
Source: Fernald (2012) and authors’ calculations.  
Note: Growth rates are annualized log changes; results are for the business sector. 
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39. In fact, Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) use a constant labor share for their 
analysis.
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fluctuations in the labor share. As King and Watson (2012) point out in the 
context of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve, such theories and applica-
tions hinge on the assumption that the labor share is mean-stationary. In 
fact, mean-stationarity is another way of interpreting “approximate con-
stancy” of the labor share. King and Watson go on to show that the recent 
decline in the labor share has rendered it nonstationary. As we have shown, 
this is true not only for the headline measure but also for its two alterna-
tives as well as for the payroll share. This means that uses of the labor share 
as a cyclical measure will have to address which part of its movements are 
cyclical and which parts reflect long-run trend movements.
The most common of such uses is that of the labor share as a proxy 
for wage markups and resource slack. Since the work of Galí and Gertler 
(1999) and Sbordone (2002), the headline measure of labor share has often 
been used as a proxy for resource slack and marginal cost fluctuations for 
the estimation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve.40 Besides the difficul-
ties with the recent time-series properties of the labor share in this context, 
a more fundamental conceptual issue is at stake. Many parts of compen-
sation captured in the numerator of the labor share arguably are not part 
of firms’ marginal costs, in the sense that they do not represent costs that 
vary with labor input. For example, it could be argued that the imputed 
hourly compensation of the self-employed is not part of firms’ direct pay-
ments to labor and thus not part of its marginal costs. This suggests that 
the payroll share may be a better proxy for wage markups than the labor 
share. However, even some components of payroll compensation, such as 
stock options, are not linked directly to the quantity of labor used by a firm. 
Hence, the labor share is not a satisfactory measure of the wedge between 
the marginal cost and the marginal product of labor. For these reasons, it is 
important to look beyond the labor share for measures of the wage markup. 
One potential way forward might be to focus directly on wages instead, 
rather than on compensation and productivity.
ProXy For ineQUality A second interpretation of the labor share is not 
as a measure of the division of income between the productive factors of 
labor and capital, but instead between workers and capitalists. In line with 
this, the International Labour Organization (2013) interprets the recent 
decline in the labor share as an indication of inequitable growth.
As has been widely documented (and is reiterated in figure 4), the period 
during which the U.S. labor share declined was accompanied by a substan-
40. For example, the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US model uses such a specification for its 
inflation forecast (Brayton and Tinsley 1996, table 6, page 22).
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tial increase in income inequality. It is natural, then, to conjecture that the 
two processes are linked. Two aspects of figure 4 strike a note of caution, 
however. First, the increase in inequality within labor income dwarfs the 
movements in the labor share. A second, related feature of figure 4 is 
that the labor share has in fact been propped up by the labor income of 
very highly paid individuals in recent decades. That is, to some extent, 
labor’s share has declined despite the increased earnings of the super-
rich. To give an example, executive pay is part of labor compensation 
and is thus included in the labor share. Thus, the $13 million in com-
pensation, $7.2 million in severance payment, shares worth $3.56 million, 
and a performance bonus of $2.4 million that one CEO received during his 
10-month stint at a major tech company in 2010 and 2011 all contributed 
positively to the labor share during those two years. In this sense, then, 
the decline in the labor share is an inadequate measure of the increase in 
income inequality.
By the same token, a further implication of figure 4 is that the measured 
decline in the labor share would be much larger if not for the gains of the 
top 1 percent of payroll and self-employment income. By 2010, the labor 
share of the bottom 99 percent of taxpayers had fallen to approximately 
50 percent from just above 60 percent prior to the 1980s. Aggregate mea-
sures of the labor share miss this richer detail in the income structure, so 
that the decline in the aggregate share significantly understates the increase 
in income inequality in the U.S. over the last 25 years.
V.B. Drivers of Future Movements in the Labor Share
Our analysis of a range of factors behind and explanations for the recent 
decline in the labor share raises the possibility that the decline in the labor 
share over the last 25 years has its origins in U.S. producers facing increased 
import competition. Based on this suggestive evidence, if globalization 
continues during the next decades, the labor share will continue to decline, 
especially in sectors that face the largest increases in foreign competition.
However, it is important to realize that sector-specific developments, 
such as the tech bubble at the end of the 1990s, can have a surprisingly 
big effect on movements in the labor share. This suggests that, going 
forward, it is also worthwhile to consider developments that are more 
sector-specific. In addition to developments in certain industries affecting 
the aggregate labor share, particular types of legislation are also likely 
to drive movements in the near future. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) 
is one example. Since health insurance benefits are part of payroll com-
pensation, a change in the prevalence of these benefits that is not offset 
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by changes in wages and salaries will affect the payroll and labor shares. 
Moreover, since this legislation makes health insurance more accessible 
for the self-employed, it will likely result in an increase in the share of 
the labor force that is self-employed, thus changing the wedge between 
the labor share and the payroll share. This will affect the measured labor 
share, though exactly how it does so will depend on how the BLS decides 
to treat self-employment income in its measurement of the labor share 
going forward.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
SUSANTO BASU  This paper by Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and 
Ays¸egül S¸ahin reminds me of the reasons I have always enjoyed the Brook­
ings Papers. First, the paper does a thorough and careful job of measure-
ment, and it shows that measurement really matters for understanding the 
trends in the U.S. labor share. Second, it does a nice job of discussing 
the relevant theory in the context of stylized facts from the data. Finally, 
it advances an interesting and reasonable hypothesis to explain the data, 
and supports that hypothesis with an empirical test. Putting these results 
together, the paper significantly advances the literature regarding the evo-
lution of the U.S. labor share. In my discussion, I point out some unan-
swered questions, which either these or other authors may take up as they 
build on the findings of this paper.
One major open question is whether the evolution of the labor share is 
driven almost exclusively by the general forces of globalization or techno-
logical change, or whether it is driven to a significant extent by country- 
specific policies. Certainly, political and historical discussions of the trends 
in the U.S. labor share often point to the alleged bias of political leaders 
toward capital and away from labor over the period in which the labor 
share has declined.1 The paper’s finding that the labor share has declined 
more in industries that are more exposed to trade does not settle the 
issue. For it is possible that some countries adopt policies that leave 
workers more exposed to the forces of the marketplace, while others shelter 
1. Exhibit A is usually Ronald Reagan’s action to break the strike of the Professional 
Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) in 1981 by firing the striking air traffic 
controllers. See, for example, McCartin (2011).
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workers to some extent, for example by erecting trade barriers or subsidizing 
industries exposed to import competition.
In its recent Global Wage Report, the International Labour Organization 
(2013) documents that country labor shares have generally trended down 
over the last decade, but with significant heterogeneity even within country 
groups (for example, among advanced or middle-income countries). How-
ever, simply documenting that heterogeneity exists also is insufficient to 
demonstrate that country-specific policies have a significant role in driving 
labor shares, since it might be the case that industry labor shares exhibit 
similar trends across countries and that country labor shares show different 
trends simply due to differences in industry composition. Only a cross-
country, cross-industry study can decompose changes in labor’s share into 
country effects (which may be due to policies) versus industry effects 
(which might be due either to trade or to changes in technology). One can 
make further progress on the important question of decomposing industry 
effects between trade and technology by using observed measures of trade 
openness, such as the authors’ ingenious measure of trade exposure.
One of the paper’s interesting findings that inclines me toward the trade 
explanation is the finding that labor share declines are heavily concentrated 
in the goods-producing and resource-extracting industries (table 2, lower 
panel). Goods, of course, are easily traded, and it is reasonable that trade 
would affect goods more readily than services, despite the recent discus-
sions of service outsourcing through call centers or “back office” support 
in other countries. Interestingly, one type of service that is readily traded is 
shipping and air transport, and this industry group also shows a significant 
decline in labor’s share.
While the trade explanation appears plausible at both a first and a sec-
ond look, it is important to know the channels through which trade affects 
income distribution. The standard neoclassical theory of distribution is 
frankly unappealing, since a stable income distribution requires knife-edge 
functional-form assumptions: either production functions must be Cobb-
Douglas, or technological progress must be solely labor-augmenting. Nei-
ther assumption is appealing, and both are inconsistent with large bodies of 
empirical evidence. The state of the art in this area, in the work of Charles 
Jones (2005), pushes the required assumption back one step by showing 
that if the distribution of new ideas takes the Pareto form, then the long-run 
aggregate production function will be Cobb-Douglas. But of course this 
leaves open the question of why the distribution of ideas should take the 
Pareto form. Bringing in trade considerations obscures but does not change 
this basic criticism, since trade might lead to greater convergence in labor 
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shares across countries at a point in time, but the long-run dynamics of the 
world labor share distribution would still be governed by the basic forces 
of neoclassical distribution theory.
Non-neoclassical theories of distribution, especially Marxian ones, take 
the perspective that income distribution, rather than being governed by 
marginal productivity in competitive markets, is due more to bargaining 
power and rent sharing. In such frameworks, the long-run labor share is 
stable if bargaining power is constant. While the forces that make bargain-
ing power stable are not clear, the assumption of a stable détente between 
firms and workers seems more palatable than the knife-edge functional- 
form assumptions demanded by neoclassical theory. Trade could affect 
labor share in these frameworks as well by changing “threat points” and 
thus the division of rents. For example, in a world without trade, workers 
producing an important input in a supply chain may have more power, 
because a strike or work slowdown might bring the whole production pro-
cess to a halt. With access to trade, the threat might be less if the good 
can be obtained from other countries, although perhaps with a delay. With 
lower bargaining power, workers could not claim as large a share of the 
pie. Furthermore, if trade lowers market power in the product market, there 
may be fewer pure profits to be split between firms and workers. If workers 
formerly received a disproportionate share of these rents, their reduction 
would also reduce labor’s share.
Thus, the view that trade could reduce labor’s share over long stretches 
of time is consistent with both neoclassical and non-neoclassical theories 
of distribution. Yet to understand where the process is headed and what 
(if any) policy response is appropriate, it will be important to understand 
the mechanisms through which trade, technology, and other forces lead to 
changes in income distribution. This paper has made an admirable effort to 
highlight the proximate reasons for the recent trends in labor’s share, but 
the deeper causes are still mysterious.
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COMMENT BY
BRENT NEIMAN  Labor’s share of aggregate income has declined over 
the past few decades in most countries around the world. This trend is 
seemingly at odds with one of the key stylized facts in all of macroeconom-
ics and carries implications for a diverse set of issues including inequality, 
macroeconomic dynamics, and growth accounting. As I learned from con-
versations with several attendees at the Brookings Panel, the future trend of 
the labor share is even a critical input into forecasting the federal budget.1
This paper by Michael Elsby, Bart Hobijn, and Ays¸egül S¸ahin offers a 
thorough and useful characterization of the labor share decline in the United 
States. The authors make three key contributions (not listed in the order of 
their appearance in the paper). First, they navigate the classic measurement 
challenges associated with adjusting the labor share to include the relevant 
income earned by proprietors, arguing that the method of adjustment for 
proprietors’ income used in an important labor share indicator mislead-
ingly amplifies the underlying decline. Their preferred adjustment method 
reveals that the true labor share decline over the period studied is closer 
to 4 percentage points than to the headline measurement of 6 percentage 
points.
Second, they consider the implications of a labor share decline of the 
magnitude observed to date. They study several environments in which 
the labor share is used as an input to learn about other economic objects or 
outcomes and ask whether inferences about those outcomes would mean-
ingfully change with a 4-percentage-point drop in the labor share. This 
is a practical way to assess quantitatively whether the decline in the 
labor share is “big” or not. These two contributions will play useful roles 
in shaping continuing work on this topic.
Their third contribution is to offer their view of what has and what has 
not caused the labor share decline. They argue against explanations such 
as the changing skill composition of the labor force, the reduced influence 
of unions, and the substitution away from labor in response to lower prices 
of investment goods. Instead, they conclude that increases in spending on 
imports played a critical role in generating the labor share decline. I 
do not find this part of the paper convincing. An explanation relating to 
international trade strikes me as both appealing and plausible, but I would 
like to see a framework formally relating trade and the labor share in a 
1. Capital is generally taxed at a lower rate than labor. Taking the GDP forecast as 
unrelated to factor shares, as many budget forecasts do, the share of labor income is therefore 
critical in the determination of tax revenues.
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multi-country context that could be tested using data from exporters and 
importers. The paper stops short of taking these steps.
measuRement issues As discussed by Alan Krueger (1999) and Douglas 
Gollin (2002), one key challenge to measuring the labor share, either within 
a country over time or across countries at a period in time, is to account for 
proprietors whose income typically combines that which we would asso-
ciate with labor and that which we would associate with capital. Perhaps 
the most common adjustment is to scale employee compensation by the 
ratio of total hours worked to total hours worked by payroll employees (a 
ratio that exceeds one due to the self-employed).2 This correction, which 
implicitly assumes that wages are equal for the self-employed and payroll 
employees, is the method used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in 
its headline measure, perhaps the most widely observed indicator of labor 
share movements.
The paper shows, strikingly, that the amount of labor income implic-
itly attributed to proprietors by this method in some years exceeds the sum 
total of all proprietors’ income (including labor and capital)! While this 
BLS method may still be the most appropriate in many cases, the authors’ 
finding is a compelling indictment of the BLS’s headline methodology, at 
least for those particular years. The authors go on to suggest that related 
issues result in a 2-percentage-point overstatement in the headline BLS 
labor share decline.
It is useful to point out an alternative strategy to circumvent these 
measurement issues, used in my own work with Loukas Karabarbounis 
(Karabarbounis and Neiman 2014), which is to focus on labor share in the 
corporate sector. Gross value added in the corporate sector by construc-
tion excludes the activity of most proprietors and therefore immediately 
bypasses many of these issues. Labor share in the corporate sector can be 
easily calculated each quarter for the United States using the NIPA tables. 
An additional benefit of this approach is that it typically allows labor share 
to be calculated using standard national accounting data, which makes 
clean international comparisons possible.3 The corporate labor share in the 
United States has declined by about 5 percentage points over the period 
studied by the authors.
2. Or, if data do not permit this, the equivalent adjustment is often made using the ratio 
of the number of total workers to the number of wage earners.
3. One disadvantage (or advantage, depending on the purpose) is that this measure will 
not reflect labor share in the government or non-corporate sectors. These omitted sectors 
have represented between 40 and 45 percent of GDP, in the United States and globally, 
respectively, since 1975.
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implications oF the laBoR shaRe decline Too often, discussion of the 
implications of changes in the labor share focus on the direction of 
the changes and ignore their magnitude. Section V of the paper takes 
this issue head-on and asks quantitatively to what extent the labor share 
decline matters for inferences about growth in total factor productivity 
(TFP) in calculations of the Solow residual. The authors find that if one 
used a labor share estimate that was 5 percentage points higher than 
the true share, standard calculations of the Solow residual would only 
deviate from the true Solow residual by a trivial amount. They convince 
me that measured Solow residuals are relatively invariant to under- or 
overestimates of about 5 percentage points in the level of labor shares in 
growth accounting exercises for the United States.
This is a nice point, but I would caution readers interested in aggre-
gate technology growth against ignoring the labor share decline. After 
all, the interpretation of the Solow residual may depend on the cause 
of the non-constant labor share. For example, if the labor share decline 
teaches us that the aggregate production function is not Cobb-Douglas 
and that technological growth has been factor-biased, or if the labor share 
decline is driven by an increase in markups, then standard measures of TFP 
may diverge from true technology, a point emphasized by Susanto Basu 
and John Fernald (2002).4
What caused the decline in the u.s. laBoR shaRe? I now turn to the 
authors’ assessment of the driver of the labor share decline. They start 
by ruling out other stories, including the explanation advanced in 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) that ties the decline to reduced rela-
tive prices of investment goods in an environment where capital and labor 
have an elasticity of substitution that exceeds unity. Elsby, Hobijn, and 
S¸ahin observe that such a story involves significant capital deepening. In 
their figure 8, they offer evidence that from about 1990 to about 2005, a 
two-sided moving average of the capital-labor ratio began a steady and 
nearly monotonic acceleration.
Their interpretation of the timing of this trend is that it offers support for 
the explanation of Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) in the period prior to 
2000 but argues against it as an explanation for a labor share decline in the 
more recent decade. They believe this is so because the smoothed growth 
rate of this series plateaus at near historically high levels from about 1998 
4. In fact, Fernald and Neiman (2011) apply this point and attribute much of the earlier 
controversy over technology measurement in Singapore to a trend in the economic profit and 
labor shares at the industry level.
comments and discussion 59
to 2003 and then declines at the end of their sample. The labor share trend 
surely reflects multiple factors, and some additional shocks surely played 
an import role in determining factor shares in the run-up to and during the 
Great Recession.
My view is that the effects of adjustment costs, the business cycle, and 
variable utilization not only make high-frequency measurements of the true 
capital-labor ratio quite difficult but also make it more difficult to quan-
titatively map these measurements to the alternative models the authors 
discussed. This is especially so given that the underlying series are highly 
volatile and only the 10-year moving average is plotted. I believe, there-
fore, that one should not conclude much from these subtle comparisons 
of the timing of inflection points in the time series. In fact, comparing the 
time series of U.S. imports and the labor share would similarly cast doubt 
on the authors’ explanation that import competition has driven labor share 
downward.
U.S. imports plunged in 2009, and the timing of this trade collapse 
coincides with the sharpest downward movement in the U.S. labor share. 
Similarly, the authors note a “brief surge” in the labor share coinciding with 
the late 1990s tech bubble. But this latter period corresponds to a rapid rise 
in imports, which increased as a share of GDP by more than 2 percent-
age points from 1998 to 2000, a larger increase in just 2 years than had 
occurred in the preceding 8 years (from 1990 to 1998).
For these reasons, I prefer the approach the authors turn to in sec-
tion IV of using cross-industry variation in longer-term trends with data 
from detailed U.S. industries. One challenge here, however, is that such an 
approach relies quite heavily on homogeneity across industries. For exam-
ple, the authors show in their figure 10 that there is, if anything, a nega-
tive relationship between changes in the payroll share and equipment price 
across industries in their data. The authors infer from this that declines 
in the relative price of capital are not driving labor share reductions. But 
this inference relies on a comparison of trends in the legal and electrical 
equipment industries, for example, and the dynamics of the labor share in 
such industries might be impacted by different shocks in addition to the 
reduced equipment prices they face.5
We do a very similar analysis in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) but 
using data for multiple countries, which allows us to include industry (and 
5. It is also worth noting that these comparisons exclude the labor income of proprietors 
and therefore assume that the unmeasured influence of proprietors’ labor income is ortho-
gonal across sectors to the equipment price trend.
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country) fixed effects.6 If we limit our regressions to include only U.S. data 
points, our results are quite similar to those found by the authors. If we 
include all countries as well as the fixed effects, however, we in fact infer 
from the same conceptual exercise that declining relative investment prices 
were indeed a primary driver of the labor share decline.
In addition to this more technical point, my view is that because the 
labor share decline has been a global phenomenon, an international per-
spective is critical to developing an understanding of its causes. And this 
is particularly the case when considering explanations for the decline that 
involve international trade.
For example, the simplest story to explain how trade might bring about 
a labor share decline is that capital-abundant countries might shift produc-
tion toward those sectors that use capital more intensively in production. 
These countries would then export those goods in exchange for imports 
of the labor-intensive goods that labor-abundant countries would shift 
their production toward. But this (Heckscher-Ohlin–based) story cannot be 
reconciled with the data presented in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), 
which show labor shares in labor-abundant countries like China, India, and 
Mexico declining even more rapidly than in capital-abundant countries like 
the United States, Canada, and Japan.7
Taking Elsby and coauthors’ empirical results together with those 
from my own work, I might speculate that sectors with more imports 
experienced steeper labor share declines precisely because trade was 
intensive in investment goods. This would mean, therefore, that reduc-
tions in trade frictions in recent decades simultaneously increased import 
spending and decreased the relative price of investment.8
6. Our industry definitions are more aggregated than those of the authors. Unlike the 
authors, we use the price of investment goods relative to the price of output in each industry 
and scale the labor share change by the inverse of the capital share, the specification con-
sistent with the existence of a constant elasticity of substitution production function in each 
sector. The authors note that their results are robust to the use of this alternative definition 
of the capital price.
7. To deal with this, the paper proposes that trade may instead be occurring in tasks that 
may at the same time be a relatively labor-intensive process in one country and a relatively 
capital-intensive process in the other. But that story would imply lower initial levels of labor 
share in the United States, not the higher levels actually observed.
8. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) report that there is generally no significant cross-
sectional relationship between the change in a country’s imports, exports, or overall trade 
relative to GDP—both multilaterally and bilaterally with China—and the trend in its labor 
share. However, a comparable cross-country analysis with industry-level data might have 
greater power.
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The authors are aware of these challenges and admirably sketch some 
ideas for overcoming them in a richer framework. Hopefully, their results 
will encourage a literature to develop models that can be confronted with 
cross-country and cross-industry data, with greater attention to clarifying 
whether causality runs through the trade channel. This, of course, is what 
the authors mean when they write “leaving aside the important question 
of identifying the underlying economic channel for future work.” Testing 
their hypothesis will require a clear articulation of a mechanism linking 
trade and the labor share with empirical predictions for both importers 
and exporters.
In sum, I find this to be a well-written and useful paper on an important 
topic, which I hope and anticipate will have a significant impact on the 
literature. Among other things, the paper taught me quite a bit about the 
proper handling of proprietors’ income in labor share measurement and 
helped me formalize a sense of why the labor share decline matters in some 
settings that I had not considered before. Finally, the authors’ hypothesis 
that increasing imports are driving the U.S. labor share decline is certainly 
plausible and appealing. The increase in trade is a global shock that started 
in the early 1980s, and it is potentially consistent with the results offered 
in Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) on the relative price of investment. 
I remain keenly interested in this story, but the evidence presented in this 
paper has not yet convinced me of the role of trade in the labor share decline.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  Alan Krueger spoke up to underline how 
important the labor share is to budget forecasting, particularly in project-
ing tax revenue, because labor income is taxed at a higher rate than capital 
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income. He urged researchers to think about ways to make the labor share 
a more useful concept for forecasters of the government budget.
Edward Glaeser expressed surprise that the payroll share in education 
and health services had increased by 34 percent and thought that was an 
interesting insight to come out of the paper. He also requested that the 
authors pay more attention to relative prices and quantities in order to attri-
bute the change in the labor share to the increase in the number of workers 
or to an increase in those workers’ wages.
Valerie Ramey mentioned a Brookings Paper by Olivier Blanchard in 
which he sought to explain why the capital share had increased in continen-
tal Europe but not in the Anglo-Saxon countries.1 Ramey suggested that it 
might be useful to read the current paper in connection with the Blanchard 
paper, since the labor share and the capital share are intrinsically linked.
Alan Blinder pointed out something that he was surprised had not been 
raised either by the authors or by the two commenters, namely that the 
emergence of India, China, and the former Soviet Union into the global 
economy starting in the 1980s and 1990s meant that the world labor supply 
had essentially doubled, while capital during the period had remained con-
stant. This shift should have significant implications for the relative returns 
to labor and capital.
Paul Krugman challenged Blinder’s suggestion, arguing that if global-
ization were the cause of the declining U.S. labor share, in the developing 
countries the labor share should be increasing. Instead, the labor share in 
those countries has been decreasing. Additionally, capital has been flowing 
not from north to south but from south to north, and income inequality has 
been increasing globally, in developing as well as developed countries. It 
struck him as a serious puzzle that remains to be understood.
Robert Gordon complimented the authors for doing a good job of 
showing that changes in labor share tell us very little about inequal-
ity, since measures of labor share include the incomes of executives, 
including their stock options. He suggested that the authors update their 
numbers to reflect the latest measures of inequality by Thomas Piketty 
and Emmanuel Saez, which show that half the income gains since 1993 
went to the top one percent. Additionally, he said that he had decomposed 
the labor share as reported by the BEA’s National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA), which report on the entire economy and not just on the 
private nonfarm share as the BLS reports. According to NIPA, there had 
1. Olivier Blanchard, “The Medium Run,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1997, 
no. 2: 89–158.
comments and discussion 63
been a sharp increase in the labor share starting in the 1960s and then 
a long-run decline, so that the share is now back to where it was in 1960. 
The BLS shows a much larger decline in the labor share than NIPA shows. 
Gordon said that about half of this discrepancy between the BLS and NIPA 
was due to the fact that the NIPA concept of labor’s share applies to the 
entire economy, including the government, household, and institutional 
sectors, whereas the BLS concept applies only to the 73 percent of the 
economy that excludes those sectors.
Wendy Edelberg was interested in the authors’ finding that the decline 
in total labor share in the United States has not been caused by a reduction 
in those industries that have a high labor share, though discussions about 
the impact of imports might lead one to assume this was the case. This led 
her to wonder whether the causal mechanism for the declining share could 
have much more to do with a decline in American workers’ bargaining 
power, that is, that the growing competition with foreign imports has left 
them with less ability to hold onto good wages.
Bart Hobijn replied that he and his coauthors had looked into inter-
national labor share but they had been unable to figure out the differences 
in data sources. Still, he thought that the international dynamics of the labor 
share would be a fruitful area for future research. In response to Susanto 
Basu’s comment, he indicated that the industry effect could be either tech-
nology or industry exposure to trade.
Michael Elsby replied by noting that as some industries were pay-
ing much higher wages than others, it would be interesting to compare 
the inter-industry wage differential to the import exposure of those indus-
tries. Looking internationally and responding to Brent Neiman’s comment, 
Elsby suggested that it was conceivable that outsourcing could increase 
the capital intensity of both the country doing the outsourcing as well 
as the country receiving the jobs, depending on the initial capital intensity 
of the host and source countries and the capital intensity of the technology 
being outsourced.
